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Competition Policy for Labour Markets
By Herbert Hovenkamp*
1.
Antitrust law in many jurisdictions defines its consumer welfare goal in terms of
low consumer prices. For example, mergers are challenged when they threaten to cause a
price increase from reduced competition in the post-merger market.1 While the consumer
welfare principle is under attack in some circles,2 it remains the most widely expressed goal
of antitrust policy in the United States.
2.
We would do better, however, to define the consumer welfare principle in terms of
output rather than price. Competition policy should strive to facilitate the highest output in
any market that is consistent with sustainable competition.3 That goal is in most ways the
same as a goal of pursuing lower consumer prices; that is, as output goes up prices go down.
But thinking of consumer welfare in terms of output has other notable advantages. For
example, while competitive firms do not control the market price, unless they are in cartels,
each firm does control its own output.
3.
Further, focusing entirely on price makes it awkward to work the supply side of
markets into debates about consumer welfare. Labour markets are a notable example.
Labour appears in the market as suppliers, not as purchasers. While consumers-asconsumers benefit from lower prices, combatting restraints in labour markets generally
focuses on wage suppression. That is, today the principal problem of competition policy in
labour markets is wages that are too low, not those that are too high.4 In some minds that
creates an antinomy: restraints lead to higher prices on the consumer side of the market.
Unrestrained labour markets lead to higher wages, which in turn lead to higher prices. By
the same token, labour cartels, including some of the activities of labour unions, tend to
raise the costs of labour and may have an upward effect on product prices.
4.
But product consumers and labourers have one thing in common: just as consumers
benefit from high output because it produces lower prices in product markets, so too labour
benefits from high output because it increases the demand for jobs and, in the process,
boosts wages. All other things including technology being unchanged, higher output
requires more labour. Under perfect competition on both sides of the market, each worker
*

James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Wharton
School.
1

See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(Aug. 19, 2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010
(repeatedly expressing concern for higher prices resulting from mergers.
2

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, __ J. Corp. L. ___
(2020) (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197329.
3

Under robust competition a firm sets its price at or near marginal cost, just recovering a reasonable
return on its fixed and variable costs. This output level is minimally sufficient to sustain a firm
while giving it a competitive rate of return.
4

For a brief discussion of the problem of excessive wages see discussion infra concerning the labour
immunity.
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receives the marginal value of his or her production. In a very important sense, the fortunes
of consumers and the fortunes of labour are linked together.
5.
In the United States we have traditionally seen anti-labour policies as coming from
the political right, through such means as right-to-work laws that drive wages down5 or
other forms of anti-union activity. But today the competition policy advocated on the left
has its own share of anti-worker sentiment, particularly in the form of attacks on low prices.
Higher prices certainly harm consumers, but they also harm labour by reducing output.

1. Labour Markets: Assessing Power and Competitive Effects
6.
When we speak of a competitive firm, we usually begin by thinking of its position
in the market in which it sells. But firms can exercise market power on both the buying and
the selling side of the market. Just as a firm with market power or a cartel restrains trade
by reducing output and raising price in the product market where it sells, so to it can restrain
trade by reducing its purchasing in an input market in order to suppress prices, including
the price of labour.6 Some firms may have sufficient power to do this unilaterally. Others
might do it by forming a buy-side cartel. In addition, some mergers yield the power to
suppress wages.7
7.
A particular firm does not necessarily have significant market power on both the
selling and the buying side at the same time. Similarly, a cartel need not exercise power on
both sides of its market. Some firms can have significant power on the buying side, but
very little on the sell side, or vice-versa. Further, the boundaries of a market can differ
substantially for a firm’s buying and selling sides. A good illustration is the United States
Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Mandeville Island Farms, which involved a cartel
among sugar refining companies suppressing their purchases of sugar beets in order to
lower input costs. Sugar beets are grown and shipped in small geographic areas because
they are perishable agricultural products and transportation costs are high in relation to
value. By contrast, the end product of sugar beet refining – table sugar – can be shipped at
least nationwide. It need not be refrigerated, and shipping costs are lower in relation to
value. This particular cartel of sugar beet refiners was limited to the northern part of the
state of California, where there were only three purchasing refiners buying beets from
farmers scattered over a small geographic range.8 As the Supreme Court observed, the beets
subject to the cartel were all located in a small area of California. However, “…the beets
5

See, e.g., Elise Gould and Will Kimball, “Right to Work” States Still Have Lower Wages,
Economic Policy Institute (Apr 22, 2015), available at https://www.epi.org/publication/right-towork-states-have-lower-wages/. See also Sudheer Chava, Andras Danis, and Alex Hsu, The Impact
of right-to-Work Laws on Worker Wages: Evidence from Collective Bargaining Agreements (Oct.
2018), George Tech Scheller college of bus. Res. Paper #18-1, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3088612.
6

See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony in Law and Economics (2010).

7

See discussion infra; and see Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers
in
Labour
Markets
___
Ind.
L.J.
__
(2019),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124483 (impact of mergers in labour
markets).
8

Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
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are converted into sugar and [then] the sugar starts on its interstate journey to the tables
of the nation…”9 Indeed, the case itself was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court
under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, because the explicit restraint covered only the
sugar beets grown within a single state, but the basis of jurisdiction was the post-production
shipment of the refined sugar that was shipped nationally.10
8.
The practical effect of the price fixing was that the cartel members produced less
sugar, but that decrease in output very likely had little effect on the market price or market
wide output of refined sugar, because the refined product was resold in a competitive
market that was much larger than the market in which the sugar beets were purchased.11
9.
Labour markets often have similar characteristics. For example, many geographic
markets for labour are relatively small for the simple reason that workers travel over a
relatively narrow range.12 By contrast, the geographic markets in which their employers
sell the product can be much larger, although they are not necessarily so. Each market must
be calculated individually. Further, firms maximise depending on the amount of power they
have in a particular market, and those amounts differ on the buying vs. the selling side.
Importantly, most workers who are already hired commute over a fairly narrow market. By
contrast, job search distances can be larger, and sometimes much larger, but these are more
akin to potential entrants rather than incumbent competitors.
10.
This has some important implications for competition policy. First, restraints
should be assessed in the particular market that is restrained. A good illustration is State of
California v. eBay, Inc,13 where the court approved an antitrust settlement shutting down a
cartel involving a “no poaching” agreement between eBay, Inc. and Intuit, Inc., covering
specialised computer engineers. These two firms are not competitors in the product markets
in which they sale. Intuit makes business software, including popular consumer programs
such as Turbotax and Quickbooks. By contrast, eBay is a general purpose online auction
site that does not manufacture any computer software, although it sells some new and used
Intuit products as a broker through some of its auction vendors. That is, the firms have
9

334 U.S. at 228.

10

The decision thus overruled United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), which arose
under similar facts. Sugar in that case was refined entirely within New York, but then later shipped
across state lines. Briefly, earlier interpretations of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, including E.C.
Knight, required that the challenged restraint govern transactions that were in commerce and actually
crossed a state line. In its decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) the Supreme Court
expanded Commerce Clause jurisdiction to reach activities that were either in or “affecting”
interstate commerce. Mandeville Island Farms was one of the earlier decisions applying this
extended reach to the Sherman Act. See 1B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
¶266 (4th ed 2013).
11

Another fact that the Court did not mention is that after refining beet sugar is chemically identical
to cane sugar and the two are widely regarded as distinguishable.
12

Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labour Markets ___ Ind.
L.J. __ (2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124483; Ioana
Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, Mismatch: Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search, 10 Am.
Econ.J.: Macroeconomics 42 (2018); José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi
Taska, Concentration in US Labour Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018).
13

2014 WL 4273888 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 2014)
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virtually no competitive relationship in the product market, and a very limited vertical
relationship through the sale of Intuit products on the eBay auction site. On the product
side the two firms would not be considered competitors for merger analysis and would very
likely be unable to profit from product price fixing.
11.
Nevertheless, on the labour side the two firms compete for the same technically
trained employees and could profit by agreeing to suppress wages. A no-poaching
agreement for labour is the rough equivalent of a market division agreement in the product
market. Basically, the firms agreed not to hire away one another’s workers in a given
specialty. In approving the settlement, the court summarised the allegations:
eBay's agreement with Intuit eliminated competition for employees, and it harmed
employees by reducing the salaries, benefits, and employment opportunities they
might otherwise have earned if competition had not been eliminated. The
agreement also distorted the competition among employers for skilled employees
and likely resulted in some of eBay's and Intuit's employees remaining in jobs that
did not fully use their unique skills. Additionally, the agreement harmed
California's economy by depriving Silicon Valley of its usual pollinators of ideas,
hurting the overall competitiveness of the region.14
12.
There was no claim that the no-poaching agreement affected product prices to
consumers.
13.
Cases such as Mandeville Island Farms illustrate that firms can operate in very
different geographic markets on the buy and sell sides, and eBay illustrates that they can
operate in very different product markets as well as geographic markets. Today it seems
clear that most labour markets are geographically quite small, many of them no larger than
the commuting range of employees.15 One consequence of this is that labour market
concentration is in fact quite high, often significantly higher than product market
concentration. Often the shipping range of manufactured products is considerably larger
than the commuting or job search range of actual and prospective employees. 16 Further,
wages are forced down as labour market concentration is higher, just as product margins
go higher as concentration goes up.
14.
In general, EU law on the subject of competition policy and labour market restraints
appears to be less well developed than United States law, although some member states
have been more active. While EU competition law is much more enthusiastic about
consumer welfare as a competition policy goal, it has tended not to connect this to the
welfare of workers. While some fret that EU law is inadequately equipped to deal with
worker welfare, the statutory tools seem to be adequate.17 Further, EU law appears to apply

14

California v. eBay, Inc., 2015 WL 5168666 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 3, 2015).

15

See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra.

16

See Marinescu & Rathelot, Mismatch, supra.

17

E.g., FREDERIK ALBERT HENDRIK VAN DOORN, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF BUYER POWER IN
EU
COMPETITION
POLICY
§§
1.4,
4.2
(2015),
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/1874/312604/1/Doorn.pdf.
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to buyer power generally;18 it simply has not been very much brought to bear on power visà-vis workers.
15.
If consumer welfare is measured in terms of output rather than place, then a link
between consumer welfare and worker welfare is easily seen. In general, the consumer
welfare principle should encourage maximum output consistent with sustainable
competition.19 That outcome would produce both lower prices for consumers and greater
demand for workers.

2. Restraints on Output in Labour Markets
16.
Nearly the full range of restraints that antitrust law has traditionally condemned in
product markets can also be actionable in labour markets. These include mergers, collusion
of various kinds,20 information exchanges,21 and vertical exclusionary restraints analogised
to exclusive dealing. Measurement problems are sometimes more difficult on the buy side
of the market, particularly when reductions in purchasing can be explained by either
increased efficiency or as an exercise of monopsony power. Although fact finding can be
difficult, welfare standard that focuses on output can appropriately check restraints in the
labour market that result in lower output and suppressed wages and salaries. Restraints in
the labour market are anticompetitive when they tend to suppress wages by reducing the
output of labour.

2.1. Horizontal Mergers
17.
Analysing the impact of horizontal mergers in labour markets promises to be a large
growth area in merger enforcement. Proposed amendments to the United States merger
statute would add a concern for “monopsony” to the monopoly concerns expressed in §7
of the Clayton Act.22 In fact, however, the provision already reaches monopsony. It simply
has not been applied to purchasing market power very frequently.23 While both §3 of the

18

E.g. Case No IV/M.784, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 O.J. (L 110) 53, ¶ 136).

19

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, __ J. Corp. L. __
(2020),
available
at
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2987&context=faculty_scholarship.
20

One important set of decisions not discussed at any length here are restraints, including wage and
salary restrictions, placed on collegiate athletes. See In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cr Antitrust
Litigation, 2019 WL 1747780 (N.D.Cal., Nov. 8, 2019) (condemning NCAA restrictions on athletic
compensation under the rule of reason). See also OBannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9 th Cir. 2015)
(similar).
21

E.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (sustaining complaint that petroleum
companies exchanged information about certain classes of higher paid professional employees, with
intent of limiting competition).
22

Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act, S. 1812, 115th Cong. (2017).

23

See 4A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶980-982 (4th ed. 2016). There
are a few decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa.
1965) (granting preliminary injunction against merger alleged to suppress the merging firms’
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Clayton Act (tying and exclusive dealing) and Clayton Act §2’s Robinson-Patman price
discrimination statute apply exclusively to sellers, the merger provision contains no such
limitation.24 It applies to any merger whose effects may be substantially to lessen
competition or create a monopoly in any line of commerce, not distinguishing buyer from
seller effects.
18.
In appropriate cases merger analysis should include an investigation into the
proposed merger’s impact on the output of labour, and thus on wages. The evidence at this
time suggests that the correlation between higher labour market concentration and
downward pressure on wages is a strong or perhaps even stronger than the correlation
between product market concentration and higher product prices.25 Labour market merger
analysis may also have an analogue to the rationale for higher market prices from
“unilateral effects,” although much of that works remains to be done.26
19.
One caution about analysing mergers in labour markets relates to the treatment of
merger-specific efficiencies. Here is where focusing on output provides a good tool for
analysis, although measurement problems should not be trivialised. Often mergers provide
an opportunity for technical consolidation or streamlining that serves to reduce the demand
for labour even though it increases the firm’s output in the product market. For example,
when two manufacturing firms that each have well developed dealership networks, such as
automobile manufacturers, merge, one likely effect will be consolidation of dealerships. If
each merger partner had one dealership in a community prior to the merger, the post-merger
firm might close one of them, combining various services into one. The cost savings that
result from such streamlining might reduce the demand for labour. But this could be
consequence of efficient elimination of duplication, not an exercise of monopsony power.
In that case, such a merger should increase the post-merger firm’s product output to the
extent that its costs are lower.

2.2. Horizontal Agreements; Anti-Poaching Clauses
20.
Horizontal agreements involving labour should be subject to the ordinarily
classification of naked and ancillary restraints.27 Just as antitrust law distinguishes price
fixing from various joint purchasing and selling activities on the sell side of the market, it
needs to develop similar distinctions respecting the purchase of labour. For example,
antitrust policy distinguishes price-fixing from joint bidding. The latter occurs when two
people bid jointly for an asset that they intend to share or develop jointly. By the same
token, certain types of employment agencies engage in joint bidding for the purchase of

purchases of crude oil after finding that the geographic market in which the firms purchased was
much smaller than the one in which they sold).
24

See 15 U.S.C. §14 (tying and exclusive dealing, making it unlawful “to lease or make a sale….”);
15 U.S.C. §13 (applying to price discrimination “between different purchasers”).
25

See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note.

26

For a brief discussion, see Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for
Labour Market Power, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 536, 578- 583 (2018).
27

It appears that EU law has not yet addressed the issue.
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labour services.28 United States antitrust law has begun to address naked no poaching
agreements, finding most of them to be unlawful per se. EU law is somewhat less
developed.29 A few cases have considered and upheld agreements attending a merger that
for a relatively short term forbad the seller of a business from poaching off of that
business’s employees.30 But these are best treated as ancillary restraints attending the sale
of a business, which are ordinarily valid if they reach no further than necessary to protect
the buyer’s investment.
21.
In markets for selling products and services, price information exchanges have been
litigated many times because of the threat that they will facilitate collusion.31 By the same
token, some employers might wish to exchange wage and salary information as a device
for suppressing wages and these can be found unlawful, if their purpose or effect is to soften
competition in wages or salaries.32
22.
Anti-poaching agreements among two or more competitors are increasingly
common and just as dangerous to competition as product price fixing. No-poaching
agreements among independent firms are analogous to market division, which, if naked, is
unlawful per se. The equivalent would be if two firms agreed not to attempt to steal away
each other’s established customers. If two independent firms agree not to hire one another’s
employees, the agreement should be unlawful because it limits the ability of workers to
take advantage of mobility in order to bargain for higher wages.

28

E.g., All Care Nursing Servs. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., 135 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (joint purchasing of nursing services). Cf. Sewell Plastics, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d mem., 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991) (approving joint purchasing of bottles from a common facility where
joint purchasing enabled scale economies in bottle production).
29

See Dr. Petra Linsmeier & Dr. Cathrin Mächtle, Non-poaching and Antitrust Law, 37 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 146 (2016) (noting that as of that writing EU competition law has not
addressed the issue). See also Jean-Nicolas Maillard & Chiara Conte, New Year’s Resolution for
EU Antitrust Compliance Teams: Putting HR on My Radar Screen, STEPTOE ANTITRUST &
COMPETITION BLOG (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.steptoeantitrustblog.com/2019/01/new-yearresolution-eu-antitrust-compliance-teams-putting-hr-practices-radar-screen/. See also “War for
Talents” in the Crosshairs of Competition Authorities, NOERR (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.noerr.com/en/newsroom/News/war-for-talents-in-the-crosshairs-of-competitionauthorities.aspx (“In the past on European level, no-poaching agreements were either reviewed as
ancillary restraints to transactions or were occasionally examined in cartel proceedings along with
other competition law infringements. In any case, there has been no decision by the European
Commission dealing exclusively with no-poaching agreements.”). There are, however, some cases
in the national courts. See, e.g. Abwerbeverbot, BGH, I ZR 245/12, BGHZ 201, 205–216)
(Germany). Some other decisions are discussed in Dr. Petra Linsmeier & Dr. Cathrin Mächtle, Nonpoaching and Antitrust Law, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 146 (2016).
30

E.g., Case No IV/M.2386, MEI/Phillips, 2001 O.J. (C 332) 22, ¶¶ 1-2, 17; Case No IV/M.1482,
Kingfisher/Großlabour, ¶ 1, 24 (April 12, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers
/cases/decisions/m1482_en.pdf; Case No IV/M. 1167, ICI/Williams, ¶ 1 (Apr. 29, 1998),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1167_en.pdf.
31

See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶2111-2114 (4th ed. 2019) (in press).

32

Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001)
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23.
To be sure, firms may have an interest in protecting investment in employee
education or some intellectual property rights such as trade secrets, which could be
transported by a switching employee to another firm. However, employers do not need
agreements with each other in order to achieve these results. It is in each individual
employer’s best interest to protect itself from improper theft of its own employees. As a
result, a purely vertical noncompetition agreement should be sufficient for this purpose.

2.3. Purely Vertical Noncompetition Agreements
24.
We speak of an arrangement as “purely” vertical when there is only one person on
each side. That is, the agreement has no horizontal element. Of course, an employer may
have a large number of identical agreements with its numerous employees, and then we
must consider whether these employees can be said to be in agreement with each other. In
the product market, the closest analogue to a vertical noncompetition agreement is
exclusive dealing, although there are some differences. For example, exclusive dealing
typically prevents a dealer or intermediary from dealing in the goods of multiple suppliers
at the same time. For example, a dealer in Ford automobiles might be prohibited from
selling new Toyotas or BMWs out of the same facility. One can imagine an agreement with
an employee forbidding that employee from working for a competitor at the same time. In
fact, however, labour non-compete agreements generally apply to sequential rather than
simultaneous employment. That is, a worker may be forbidden by the agreement from
terminating its employment with one firm and then going to work for a rival, often for a
period of several months or even years.
25.
Under United States antitrust law purely vertical agreements are treated under the
rule of reason.33 EU law is, if anything, even more benign than United States law.34 That
treatment has been justified with the explanation that a trained employee or one who has
access to trade secrets or other confidential information may be in a position to harm a
former employer or free ride on employer-provided training by taking it elsewhere.35
26.
Nevertheless, that leaves the question of what to do when an employer imposes
noncompetition agreements on employees who have none of these characteristics. It does
not seem unreasonable to require an employer claiming free riding of this sort as a defense
33

Nynex Corp. vs. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998). An arguable exception remains for some
tying arrangements. See 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1720 (4th ed.
2018).
34

For more detailed information about how individual jurisdictions treat restrictive covenants in
Europe, see Guide to Employee Non-Compete Agreements in Europe, Middle East and Africa,
MERITAS
(2017),
https://www.fcblegal.com/xms/files/Meritas_Guide_to_Employee_NonCompete_Agreements_in_EMEA_2017.pdf. See also A comparison of Laws in Selected EU
Jurisdictions Relating to Post-Contractual, Non-Competition Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (August 2017), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
en/knowledge/publications/9807eea3/a-comparison-of-laws-in-selected-eu-jurisdictions-relatingto-post-contractual-non-competition-agreements-between-employers-and-employees.
35

See, e.g., Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151 (Nev. 2016) (acknowledging free
rider justification for employee non-compete agreement but striking down challenged agreement as
excessive); Delaware Elevator, Inc. . Williams, 2011 WL 1005181 (Del. Chanc. March 16, 2011);
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Powers, 2012 WL 6726538 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 27, 2012) (partially enforcing
employee non-compete agreement).
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to point to precisely the skills or proprietary information that an employee might have that
justifies such a substantial restriction. For example, an employer who imposes a
noncompetition agreement on a low level unskilled employee who has no training or
protectable secret to share seems excessive. At the very least this requires a hard look at
the employment market. The problem is much more severe when the agreement includes a
horizontal element, including agreements that apply to several individually owned
franchisees of a common franchisor.

2.4. Intra-Franchise Agreements
27.
For completely independent firms to agree with each other to restrain employee
mobility among themselves is and should be unlawful in most cases. Intra-franchise nopoaching agreements are more complex, however, because they have some of the
characteristics of both vertical and horizontal restraints.36 In a franchise system a single
franchisor, or upstream party, enters into contractual agreements with numerous local
franchisees to distribute the franchisor’s product and also take advantage of the franchisor’s
branding and other intellectual property. Economically, a franchise can achieve most of the
production efficiencies of a single firm, even though the franchise is organised as a
contractual relationship among multiple firms rather than as a single entity.37 Historically
there was some ambiguity about whether the various franchisees and franchisor in such an
arrangement should be regarded as a single entity lacking conspiratorial capacity for
purposes of the Sherman Act, and thus subject only to §2’s prohibitions for unilateral
conduct.38 In the United States, that question has been settled by the Supreme Court’s
American Needle decision, which found conspiratorial capacity between the NFL and its
individual team franchises. These individual teams were separately owned and had

36

In Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F.Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9 th
Cir. 1993) the court found that a franchisor and its franchisee were a single entity who could not
conspire, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on that basis. That conclusion is incorrect in light of
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). In any event, the no hire clause was apparently
limited to managers that received significant training by each franchisee. The court then justified
the restraint because they “prevent the franchises from ‘raiding’ one another’s [] employees after
time and expense have been incurred in training them. 794 F.Supp. at 1029.
37

See Paul H. Rubin, the Theory of the firm and the Structure of the franchise Contract, 21 J. L. &
Econ. 223 (1978). Cf. Ronald H. Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
38

E.g., Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F.Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9 th
Cir. 1993) (concluding that franchisor and franchisee were single entity who lacked conspiratorial
capacity). See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise Systems
After American Needle, 30 Franchise L.J. 216 (2011). For further economic criticism of Fischer,
see Benjamin Klein, Single Entity Analysis of Joint Ventures After American Needle, 78 Antitrust
L.J. 669, 678-679 (2013):
This rejection of contractual control as a basis for single entity treatment by the Supreme Court is
fully consistent with the economics of the firm, which makes a similar fundamental distinction
between control achieved through ownership and control achieved through a contractual
arrangement. No matter how extensive a franchisor's contractual control may be
over franchisee conduct, the contractual relationship between a franchisor and its franchisees is
considered in economics to be an agreement between two separate firms, and not to involve a single
integrated firm.
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contractual arrangements with the NFL, but their activities were tightly controlled.39 While
franchise systems have some of the attributes of a single firm they also have distinct
management and profit centers. Under American Needle some of a franchisor’s decisions,
such as the location of a corporate headquarters, belong to the firm as a single entity, but
decisions that pertain to the operation of the franchisees individually are to be regarded as
collaborative rather than unilateral. Employee movement among franchisees belongs in the
latter category.
28.
As contract partners rather than wholly owned subsidiaries of a common owner,
the individual franchisees may have different interests than those of a similarly structured
unitary firm. The story here is quite similar to the story of resale price maintenance or other
vertical intrabrand restraints imposed upon dealers authorised to sell the same brand.
Speaking of RPM, the dealers themselves have an incentive to keep their margins up,
perhaps by fixing prices. By contrast, the manufacturer is incentivised to maximise its
output, which is inconsistent with dealer price fixing. As a result, the contract arrangement
can create conflicts and opportunities for anticompetitive behavior that full common
ownership does not.
29.
In recent years United States courts have confronted agreements among the
franchisees of a single franchisor prohibiting the transfer of employees from one franchisee
to another. For example, McDonald’s, a major fast food franchisor, is involved in antitrust
litigation attacking a scheme in which each individual franchisee’s agreement contains a
provision prohibiting that franchisee from hiring away the employees of a different
franchisee of the same franchisor. The agreements are very broad, not limited to employees
who have valuable training or trade secrets that could be subject to free riding.40
30.
A related issue governing intra-franchise agreements is whether they should be
regarded as horizontal or vertical. Formally, the agreements are contained in franchise
contracts between the franchisor and each individual franchisee, which would appear to
make them vertical. At the same time, the numerous franchise agreements contain
substantially identical provisions and, to the extent they involve restraints on movement
among otherwise competing franchisees, they appear to be horizontal in effect.
31.
In Deslandes v. McDonald’s, the defendants argued that franchise-wide
noncompetition agreements which applied to a wide variety of employees across
McDonald’s franchise system should be viewed, not as a horizontal agreement among
franchisees but rather as a series of vertical agreements between McDonald’s as franchisor

39

American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).

40

Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D.Il. June 25, 2018). The challenged
clause in the McDonald’s franchise agreement provides:
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the term of this Franchise, Franchisee
shall not employ or seek to employ any person who is at the time employed by McDonald’s, any of
its subsidiaries, or by any person who is at the time operating a McDonald’s restaurant or otherwise
induce, directly or indirectly, such person to leave such employment. This paragraph [ ] shall not be
violated if such person has left the employ of any of the foregoing parties for a period in excess of
six (6) months.
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and each of its individual franchisees.41 The agreement applied even to low skill employees
and forbad them from going to work for a different McDonald’s restaurant for six months
after their employment at the previous restaurant terminated. As the court observed, given
their low wages for most employees this six month period effectively prevented them from
moving at all.
32.
The issue of inter-franchise transfer of employees exposes an important difference
between firms and franchises. A single firm that owns multiple plants or stores might
certainly have a policy governing employee transfers from one plant to another, but
typically, it would permit or even encourage some of them in order to optimise overall
productivity. As a result unitary firms do not typically have blanket prohibitions on the
movement of employees from one plant or store to another.42 As a general matter it is in a
firm’s best interests to use its employees in the most profitable way, and if an employee is
valued more at a different location the firm will agree to the move or sometimes even
reassign an employee to the different location. That observation is simply an example of
the general proposition that economic actors continuously move their resources from
positions of lesser value to those of great value. For example, if production of a given
product is cheaper at one plant than another, the plants’ owner will have an incentive to
move production to the lower cost plant. By the same token, if an employee promises to
contribute more to the value of the firm in a different location, the employer will have an
incentive to move that employee. By contrast, individual franchisees maximise the value
of their individual locations. This inclines them to be more resistant to inter-firm movement
that might deprive them of valued workers.
33.
One rationale for employee noncompetes is of course that the employee has
received significant training or perhaps possess trade secrets or other valuable information.
As a result, the noncompete agreement controls free riding that might occur when a second
employer takes advantage of the first employer’s investment in this training. In the case of
employees at the different locations of a common franchisor, the employee training and
trade secret rationales for noncompetition agreements are more difficult to defend. As a
general matter franchising is developed in order to create a system where all the stores of a
particular franchisor are more or less the same. As a result, one would not expect to find
that a particular franchisee of, say, McDonald’s had trade secrets or specialised training
that was not communicated to all franchisees. Indeed, it would generally be in a franchisor’s
best interest to have valuable learning communicated across its individual franchisee, just
as a unitary firm would ordinarily profit from communicating efficiency-enhancing
information to all of its various plants. This fact alone suggests that broad limitations on
inter-franchisee transfer of employees be regarded with suspicion. In any event, the usual
free rider rationales for limiting inter-employee transfer should not be accepted without
clear proof that they apply in a particular case. The tribunal should also ask whether such
policies are overly broad in relation to any articulated and provable justifications.
34.
What all of this suggests is that the real initiative for these franchise wide
agreements covering all types of employees is not the protection of learning at all, but rather
41

See Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2017 WL 6379219 (N.D.Ill.
Dec. 11, 2017). See also Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D.Il. June
25, 2018).
42

See John Lai, Steven S. Lui, and Eric W.K. Tsang, Intrafirm Knowledge Transfer and Employee
Innovative Behavior: the Role of Total and Balanced Knowledge Flows, 33 J. Prod. Innov. Mgmt.
90 (2016), available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jpim.12262.
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cartel suppression of wages. In this context, a blanket prohibition on inter-franchisee hiring
seems egregiously excessive and raises significant competitive concerns.

3. Anticompetitive Occupational Licensing
35.
On topic that needs more empirical study is the effect of excessive occupational
licensing on the mobility and earnings of some groups of employees. While the issue has
arisen numerous times in United States antitrust decisions, it came to a head in the Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision in FTC v. North Carolina Dental Assn.43 A divided Supreme Court
struck down a rule promulgated by a professional association controlled by dentists that
declared the service of teeth whitening to be a part of the practice of dentistry, with the
result that only licensed dentists could engage in it. The case applied U.S. antitrust law’s
“state action” doctrine, which condemns private restraints unless they are both “authorised”
by the state itself and adequately “supervised” by a disinterested state agency.44
36.
The basic problem is easily understood. Governments rightfully leave certain
aspects of control of the so-called learned professions to participants in those professions.
At a basic level that makes sense because regulation requires knowledge that only the
trained professionals are likely to have. At the same time, however, it creates significant
opportunities for anticompetitive overreaching, particularly when associations that have
quasi-legislative power and are dominated by market participants pass rules that protect
themselves at the expense of others. For example, the record in the North Carolina Dental
Association case show numerous complaints from dentists about the lower prices charged
by non-dentists provision of teeth whitening, mainly dental hygienists and cosmetologists.
However, it showed no evidence that these providers as a group had more complaints about
the quality of their service or were more likely to be a public danger. In sum, the dentists
were protecting themselves as individuals from low prices; they were not protecting their
profession from people offering deficient treatment.
37.
In the United States this presents mainly a problem of federalism – namely, to what
extent should the competition-reinforcing norms of federal antitrust law override local rules
that are often more protectionist, and thus more exclusionary. As a related matter, however,
these rules often serve to limit both the mobility and the earnings of individuals who are
capable on the merits but may lack education or certification that is costly or difficult to
acquire.

4. Conclusion: Competition Policy, Consumer Welfare and Employees
38.
The consumer welfare principle today identifies low prices as the principal goal of
antitrust policy. That has not always been the case. In the late 1970’s Robert H. Bork used
the term “consumer welfare” to describe the sum of producer profits and consumer gains.
By using this peculiar nomenclature he was able to identify an improvement in “consumer
welfare” even when consumers themselves were harmed via higher prices, provided that
43

North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

44

See generally 1 & 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶221-231 (4th ed.
2013 & Supp.).
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these losses were offset by producer gains.45 Further, Bork concluded, a relatively small
gain in productive efficiency would be sufficient to offset even significant consumer losses.
As a result, even output reducing practices such as price-increasing mergers could be said
to increase consumer welfare if these practices produced sufficiently large producer gains.
39.
Bork’s approach seriously underestimated the consumer harm that comes from
anticompetitive practices and also paid inadequate attention to the measurement problems
assessing the very complex “tradeoff” between higher prices and increase economic
welfare that his approach entailed. Perhaps coincidentally, the adoption of Bork’s approach
coincided with ever increasing price-cost margins in the United States, with the attendant
output reduction and harm to both labour and consumers. To be sure, today’s high margins
are not purely a consequence of wrong headed antitrust policy, but antitrust must be
acknowledged as a factor.46
40.
Today’s understanding of consumer welfare looks only at the welfare of consumers
as consumers. While that is a significant step forward it continues to pose some conceptual
difficulties. For example, how should we assess the affects on labour or other input
providers? While the modern consumer welfare principle favors low prices, antitrust policy
regarding labour is troubled mainly by wages that are too low. Further, many people
instinctively relate higher wages to higher consumer prices, although that correlation is
highly imperfect and often wrong.
41.
One solution to this problem is to define “consumer welfare” in terms of output
rather than price. On the demand side of the market, lower prices translate into higher
output. On the supply side, however, an absence of restrictions on supply also lead to higher
output. Practices such as anti-poaching agreements are harmful because they suppress
wages by reducing the demand for labour. Speaking more theoretically, in a perfectly
competitive market each factor on both the demand side and the supply side receives the
marginal value of its contribution.
42.
Ceteris paribus, both consumers and labour benefit from practices that tend to
increase output to its maximum sustainable level, which is a level sufficient to ensure
competitive returns to business without excessive capture of monopoly (monopsony)
profits on either the buyer or seller side of the market. When “consumer welfare” is defined
in terms of output it becomes much easier to articulate a defensible competition policy that
45

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
66, 90-97 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968); and see Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare
Principle Imperiled, ___ J.Corp.L. ___ (2020), available at file:///C:/Users/hhovenka/Downloads
/SSRN-id3197329%20(4).pdf.
46

See ram Shivakumar, The Market Powr of “Superstar” Companies is Growing,
ChicagoBoothReview (Oct. 26, 2017), available at http://review.chicagobooth.edu/
economics/2017/article/market-power-superstar-companies-growing; David Autor, David Dorn,
Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labour Share and the
Rise of Superstar Firms (MIT working paper, May 1, 2017), available at
https://economics.mit.edu/files/12979. On the European experience, which is in many ways similar,
see Cyrille Schwellnus, etc al., Labour Share Developments over the Past Two Decades: The Role
of Technological Progress, Globalisation and “Winner-takes-most” Dynamics (OECD Economics
Dept. Working Papers, No. 1502, Sep. 2018), available at https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/3eb9f9ed-en.pdf?expires=1556143083&id=id&accname=guest&checksum
=E7AD7F7BB1E806B0DBACC146FB8450CB
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does everything that antitrust can properly do to ensure a healthy economy, reflecting both
the buy and sell sides of market.
43.
But might there be worthwhile policies that deviate from this definition? Perhaps,
although at least in the United States antitrust law is not the best way to identify or
effectuate them. For example, should antitrust policy be involved in putting the brakes on
labour-reducing technologies or distribution innovations to the extent that they reduce the
demand for jobs? As a substantive matter, I doubt it, but in any event such a policy would
lie outside of the scope of antitrust law.
44.
By the same token, policies that protect smaller businesses or older technologies
from larger or lower cost firms are bad for both consumers and labour and thus violate any
antitrust principle concerned with maintaining competitive output. The current hostility
toward large platforms exhibits some of this.47
45.
On the one hand, firms like Google, Amazon, and Facebook have grown very large.
On the other hand, for the most part their prices to consumers are very low or even zero,
which tends to maximise the output not only of consumers but also of many other firms
that deal either with or through these companies.
46.
Amazon, which has been the target of antitrust attention in the United States, is a
good example. Antitrust is an extremely large online retailer of nearly every conceivable
consumer product except automobiles and a few other very large items. Its prices to
consumers are very low and consumer satisfaction ratings are high. The story with respect
to businesses is more complex. One of the largest areas of Amazon’s business is as a broker
for thousands of smaller sellers. Here, Amazon offers a choice of fulfilment options. It can
take items from other sellers, keep them in inventory, sell and ship them, take care of
billing, and remit the price less its commission to the seller. Under another option the seller
takes care of inventory and shipping and Amazon principally supplies advertising and
billing assistance. Many of these businesses undoubtedly sell more as a result of Amazon’s
assistance.48
47.
The question then becomes, what is a wise antitrust policy with respect to Amazon?
Some proposals seem to me to be distinctly wrong headed. For example, Presidential
Candidate Elizabeth Warren proposes segregating Amazon’s business of selling its own
products from its business of acting as a broker for other sellers. Under her proposal, very
large platform sellers who sell goods for other sellers would be forbidden from selling their
own goods on the same platform. The apparent thinking behind this proposal is that
Amazon would have a big competitive advantage over these other smaller firms unless
Amazon’s own products are segregated from the products offered by competing firms that
Amazon represents as a broker.
48.
Many of Amazon’s own products that it sells as a house brand, such as Amazon
Basics, compete with name brand products for which Amazon acts as a buyer-reseller or
broker. Many of these products are sold at high margins and Amazon’s entry has served
chiefly to give Amazon’s customers a lower price alternative. A good example is the
AmazonBasics brand of household alkaline batteries, which are the types of batteries that
are used in many consumer electronic products, including cameras, remote controls, or
47

See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals, The
Regulatory Review (Mar. 25, 2019), available at https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/25/
hovenkamp-warren-campaigns-antitrust-proposals/.
48

Ibid.
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smoke detectors. The name brand batteries sold on the Amazon website are some of the
very firms whose high margins have contributed to the monopoly problem. For example,
Duracell is owned by Berkshire-Hathaway. Three other brands, Rayovac, Eveready, and
Energizer, are sold by a holding company that is one of the largest producers of household
batteries in the world. Duracell, the market leader, controls about 45% of the market. The
energizer and Rayovac brands, which are owned by the same company, control roughly
another 40%.49 Recently the AmazonBasics brand of “generic” batteries has had
remarkable sales growth and accounts for nearly a third of online battery sales.50
49.
As is frequently the case with generic or house brands, Amazon’s sales are eating
into the value of the large branded manufacturers’ trademarks.
50.
What is missing from candidate Warren’s proposal is any good empirical work on
how the AmazonBasics and other Amazon house brands are affecting the online markets
for manufactured goods. To the extent that these house brands target small family owned
businesses with low profit margins, they may of course cause competitor distress. One
would predict, however, that Amazon’s target for new entry is branded products that enjoy
a high margin between manufacturing costs and prices. Those would be the most attractive
candidates for new entry. That certainly seems to be the case of household batteries. In this
case, permitting Amazon to sell its own “generic” batteries in competition with the name
brand seems to be an unqualified good for consumers. To the extent that lower prices
stimulate higher output, it is also good for labour. Forcing Amazon’s house brand to be
segregated from the brand names will almost certainly lead to higher name brand pricing.
51.
For other products the story may be different. For example, a company called Rain
Design was selling a laptop stand on Amazon for a price of $43. Amazon then entered with
its own AmazonBasics brand at about half that price.51 While the Rain Design product had
at least one patent, Amazon’s product apparently did not infringe it. Some of the literature
describes this as a form of predatory behavior.52 But assuming that Amazon’s price is not
predatory, and nothing suggests that it is, the subtext must be that Rain Design was entitled
to margins of more than 100% on a product that was easy to invent around and for which
there are many competitive alternatives.
52.
The best antitrust policy for labour markets is one that simultaneously makes
product markets as competitive as possible by minimising high costs and high markups,
and that also makes labour markets as competitive as possible by eliminating undue labour
market concentration and condemning restraints that unreasonably impair labour mobility.

49

See https://www.statista.com/statistics/380309/market-share-of-the-leading-alkaline-batterybrands-in-the-us/ (2016 figures).
50

https://clark.com/shopping-retail/amazon-batteries-online-sales/

51

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/got-a-hot-seller-on-amazon-prepare-fore-tailer-to-make-one-too
52

See, e.g. Olivia Solon and Julia Carrie Wong, Jeff Bezos vs. the World: Why All Companies Fear
‘Death
by
Amazon,’
The
Guardian,
April
18,
2018,
available
at
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/24/amazon-jeff-bezos-customer-data-industries
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